Understanding exports from the plant up by George Alessandria & Horag Choi
Business Review Q4  2010   1 www.philadelphiafed.org
Horag Choi is a 






BY GEORGE ALESSANDRIA AND HORAG CHOI
Understanding Exports from the Plant Up*
*The views expressed here are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System.
In January 2008, Mercedes 
officially began selling the Smart 
Four-Two car in the U.S. market. The 
arrival of this little fuel-efficient car 
was a long time coming, since Mer-
cedes had been producing and selling 
ome companies export their products abroad, 
while others choose to sell only in their 
home market. Similarly, over time, some 
nonexporters become exporters and some 
exporters stop exporting. The decision to export is a big, 
important decision for an organization, one that takes 
time and resources but one that can lead to an expansion 
of sales and profits. Policymakers recognize that although 
exporting isn’t easy, it can boost sales and create jobs 
when successful. To help in this process, many states 
devote substantial resources to encouraging exports, 
including loans, trade missions, and trade fairs. Even the 
federal government has policies that encourage exporting, 
providing special tax treatment of profits on export sales 
and low-interest loans. In this article, George Alessandria 
and Horag Choi discuss some key factors that affect 
companies’ decisions to export by describing some salient 
characteristics of establishments that export and then 
building a simple model of the decision to export that 
captures these features. 
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different models of this car in Europe 
for almost 10 years. Indeed, the U.S. 
market was the 37th export market for 
the car, even though the U.S. market 
is the largest car market in the world.1 
With high gas prices and a well-known 
parent company, the launch of this 
new product in the U.S. created a lot 
of buzz and sales: about 11,400 cars in 
six months.2 
Like Mercedes with the smart car, 
some companies export their products 
abroad, while others choose to sell 
only in their home market. Similarly, 
over time, some nonexporters become 
exporters and some exporters stop 
exporting. The decision to export is a 
big, important decision for an organiza-
tion, one that takes time and resources 
but can lead to an expansion of sales 
and profits. 
Policymakers recognize that 
exporting isn’t easy but can boost sales 
and create jobs when successful. To 
help in this process, many states devote 
1 According to Global Insight.com, in 2007 the 
top three national car markets in terms of units 
sold were the U.S (16 million), China (8 mil-
lion), and Japan (5.3 million).
2 Based on data from motorintelligence.com.2   Q4  2010 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
substantial resources to encourag-
ing exports, including loans, trade 
missions, and trade fairs.3 Even the 
federal government has policies that 
encourage exporting, providing special 
tax treatment of profits on export sales 
and low-interest loans. These policies 
are often justified by pointing to the 
desirable characteristics of exporters: 
Exporters tend to have more workers 
and are more productive than nonex-
porters.4 The hope is that if exporting 
is encouraged, some firms will hire 
more workers and become more pro-
ductive. But it could be the case that 
successful firms export rather than the 
case that exporting leads to success. 
If so, the policy implications are quite 
different.
In this article, we discuss some key 
factors that affect companies’ decisions 
to export by describing some salient 
characteristics of establishments that 
export and then building a simple 
model of the decision to export that 
captures these features. Our analysis 
has four key benefits. First, our model 
of exporting allows us to think about 
whether establishments become bigger 
and more productive when exporting 
or whether bigger and more produc-
tive establishments become exporters. 
Second, it provides a framework for 
categorizing and interpreting the barri-
ers to trade. Knowing what the barriers 
to trade are can help policymakers to 
design policies to lessen the impact of 
these barriers. Third, it also helps to 
explain the pattern of trade, since the 
number of establishments exporting 
is an important determinant of trade 
flows between countries. Finally, we 
explain how the decision to export 
may be important for the response of 
trade to changes in the costs of trade 
over time.  
SOME KEY CHARACTERISTICS 
OF EXPORTERS
We start our analysis of exporters 
and nonexporters by focusing on their 
characteristics at a moment in time in 
a few countries. To be consistent with 
the theory we develop later, which 
studies the decision to sell a single 
product overseas, we use the establish-
ment, rather than the firm, as our ba-
sic unit of analysis. An establishment 
is a physical location, or plant, where 
economic activity takes place, while a 
firm is a collection of establishments 
with the same owner. For instance, the 
Ford Motor Company owns a manu-
facturing assembly plant in Louisville, 
Kentucky, where about 4,000 workers 
assemble trucks.5 This assembly plant 
is an establishment. Ford also owns 
many plants in other parts of the U.S. 
and throughout the world, each repre-
senting an establishment. To take the 
Ford example one step further, by look-
ing at establishments, we can separate-
ly consider exports of large sport utility 
vehicles and subcompacts, since these 
products tend to be produced in differ-
ent establishments. Thus, focusing on 
establishments provides the cleanest 
look into the relationship between 
products produced and traded. 
The data we study are based on 
economic surveys of manufacturers 
undertaken by statistical agencies 
in each country. We focus on 
manufacturers because they produce 
the goods that are most easily traded 
across countries. For the U.S. our 
analysis is based on data from the 
Census of Manufactures, a survey of 
the economic activity of the universe 
of U.S. manufacturing establishments 
that is taken every five years.
Three key characteristics of 
establishments and trade emerge from 
the data. First, not all establishments 
export. In the U.S., out of 31,133 active 
manufacturing establishments in 2002 
with 100 or more employees, only 
46 percent exported anything. The 
percentage of exporters would be even 
smaller if we included establishments 
with fewer than 100 employees in 
our analysis. Second, exporters tend 
to be bigger than nonexporters, with 
nearly 50 percent more workers (an 
average of 388 workers for exporters 
and 257 for nonexporters) and twice 
as many annual sales (an average of 
$133 million vs. $67 million per year). 
Again, these gaps are even bigger if 
we include plants with fewer than 
100 employees. Third, exporters are 
more productive as measured by labor 
productivity (the amount of output 
produced per worker). For instance, in 
our sample, exporters generate nearly 
31 percent more sales per worker than 
nonexporters.
3 An example of a state-level program to help 
companies export is the Pennsylvania Market 
Access Grant (MAG). The MAG provides small 
and medium-size companies with financial 
assistance and support for entering foreign mar-
kets. Specifically, the MAG program provides 
up to $5,000 in matching funds to both offset 
a portion of the qualifying expenses associated 
with new international initiatives and provide 
international business support (http://www.
newpa.com/download.aspx?id=1114).
4 Starting in 1971, the U.S. tax statutes allowed 
companies to create a separate sales organiza-
tion for exports that exempted their export 
revenue from corporate taxes. Such tax breaks 
have been at the center of trade disputes 
between the European Union and the U.S. over 
the years and were eliminated only in 2006.
Focusing on establishments provides the 
cleanest look into the relationship between 
products produced and traded.
5 This plant assembles the F-250-F550, Super 
Duty, Lincoln Navigator, and Ford Expedition. 
It is one of 81 manufacturing locations (http://
media.ford.com/plants.cfm).Business Review Q4  2010   3 www.philadelphiafed.org
While the data show that export-
ers are bigger in terms of workers and 
sales than nonexporters, this ordering 
is not absolute. There are some small 
establishments that export, and some 
big establishments that sell only in the 
U.S., so that size is a useful, but im-
precise predictor of exporting. Figure 
1 shows how the fraction of establish-
ments exporting varies with establish-
ment size. For instance, in 2002 among 
U.S. manufacturing establishments 
with 100 to 249 employees, about 42 
percent exported, while among estab-
lishments with over 2,500 employees, 
about 80 percent exported.
Across countries, we find similar 
features of manufacturing establish-
ments. For instance, based on manu-
facturing data6 on establishments in 
Canada (in 1999) and Chile (in 2001), 
Figure 1 shows that, as in the U.S., 
not all plants export but the fraction 
of establishments exporting increases 
with size. From Table 1, we also see 
that exporters are also relatively larger 
and more productive in these countries 
too. For instance, in Canada exporters 
have 50 percent more workers, 119 per-
cent more sales, and 45 percent more 
sales per worker. Similar premiums are 
evident for Chilean exporters.
These characteristics of establish-
ments are also robust across industries. 
For instance, using similar data for the 
U.S., Andrew Bernard and Bradford 
Jensen show that these exporter pre-
miums are not just due to differences 
in industry composition or the amount 
of capital, such as machines, software, 
or infrastructure, that each worker has 
to work with. That is, within narrowly 
defined industries, we find similar 
differences between exporters and 
nonexporters. 
FIGURE 1
Fraction of Establishments Exporting by Size
DYNAMIC CHARACTERISTICS 
OF EXPORTERS AND 
NONEXPORTERS
As in the case of the factory 
producing the Smart Four-Two in 
Hambach, France, for the U.S. market, 
not all establishments are born export-
ers but rather come to this decision 
over time. Thus, the key attributes of 
exporters and nonexporters we’ve just 
described reflect both current and past 
choices made by establishments. We 
now describe how the ins and outs of 
exporting are related to the life cycle of 
establishments. 
While exporting is not a once-
and-for-all decision, it is fairly 
persistent. For instance, using a sample 
of U.S. manufacturing establishments 
contained in the Longitudinal 
* Based on plants with 100+ employees in the year of the survey. Premiums are calculated as
premium = Xexporters /Xnonexporters -1, where X is the variable in question.
TABLE 1







Employment 51% 50% 46%
Sales 97% 119% 102%
Sales per worker (labor productivity) 31% 46% 39%
6 Statistics for Chile are based on a sample 
of 794 plants with 100+ employees and, for 



















Chile (2001)Research Database (LRD), an annual 
survey similar to the Census of 
Manufactures but geared toward large 
establishments, Bernard and Jensen 
(1999) find that from 1984 to 1992, 
among U.S. exporters there was, on 
average, only a 14 percent probability 
that an exporter in one year stopped 
exporting in the next year (Table 
2). Similarly, nonexporters are likely 
to continue not exporting from one 
year to the next. For instance, in the 
U.S. from 1984 to 1992, the typical 
nonexporter in the LRD had only 
about a 12 percent chance of becoming 
an exporter in the next year. The 
churning in exporting suggests that the 
typical exporter expects to spend about 
seven years exporting when it enters 
the export market. Similarly, medium-
size nonexporting manufacturers 
expect to start exporting in eight and a 
half years.7
These movements in and out of 
exporting are also observed in other 
countries. In Chile, there are slightly 
fewer movements in and out of export-
ing, since only 11.5 percent of export-
ers stop exporting in the following 
year, while only 3.5 percent of nonex-
porters start exporting in the following 
year (Table 2). 
These movements in and out of 
exporting are also not random. Indeed, 
prior to exporting, future exporters 
are already relatively big and growing 
fast. For instance, studying a panel of 
plants that are in continuous opera-
tion, Bernard and Jensen find that 
four years prior to starting to export, 
these future exporters already sell 27 
percent more and have 20 percent 
more employees than firms that do not 
export at all over the same period. Not 
only are future exporters bigger than 
current nonexporters, but they also 
tend to grow relatively quickly prior to 
exporting. For instance, in the run-up 
to exporting, these future exporters 
tend to grow 1.4 to 2.4 percent faster in 
both sales and employment, respec-
tively. These superior characteristics of 
future exporters in size and growth are 
even larger for future exporters among 
Chilean establishments (Table 3).8
A SIMPLE MODEL OF THE
DECISION TO EXPORT 
We now describe a simple theory 
that captures the key cross-sectional 
and dynamic features of plants in-
volved in international trade. A key 
idea of this theory is that big plants 
have more to gain by exporting than 
small plants.  Additionally, big plants 
are big because they tend to be good 
at what they do and so people want 
more of their products. Taken together, 
these two ideas suggest that big plants 
are both more likely to export and 
more likely to be productive. Thus, the 
desirable characteristics of exporters 
arise because producers with desirable 
characteristics have chosen to export.
This theory is based on the work 
of Mark Roberts and James Tybout 
(1997) and contains four distinct 
elements.
Producer Heterogeneity in 
Ability. The first element of the 
theory is that producers fundamentally 
differ in their ability and hence can 
be said to be heterogeneous. Some 
establishments produce products of 
higher quality, so that people are 
willing to pay more for them; other 
plants are more productive, so that 
they can produce the same products 
but more efficiently and hence more 
cheaply. Fundamentally, both these 
sources of heterogeneity imply that 
producers differ in how efficiently they 
can convert inputs, such as workers, 
raw materials, and machines, into 
revenue and ultimately profits. 
To make this idea concrete, 
consider the market for MP3 play-
ers. Apple iPods tend to have higher 
prices than other brands with similar 
memory, yet Apple sells many iPods 
(over 200 million, and counting, since 
launch). Similarly, an establishment 
may come up with a great way of pro-
ducing a good inexpensively and then 
4   Q4  2010 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
7 The duration of exporting and nonexporting 
is calculated as the inverse of the probability of 






Probability of starting to export in t+1 12% 3.4%
Probability of stopping export in t+1 14% 11.5%
U.S. statistics are based on calculations from Bernard and Jensen (1999), which are based on data 
from the U.S. Longitudinal Research Database. Chile statistics are based on the industrial census.
TABLE 2
Probability an Establishment Starts or
Stops Exporting
8 These calculations are based on plants that are 
continuously producing and do not take into 
account how the likelihood of survival differs 
by plant size or export participation. When 
examining the relationship between exporting 
and exiting, or going out of business, Bernard 
and Jensen find that plants that export are less 
likely to exit, controlling for other characteris-
tics of plants.Business Review  Q4  2010   5 www.philadelphiafed.org
be able to undercut its competitors 
on price to attract more customers. In 
the iPod example, this can be thought 
of as the original innovation making 
it easy for people to carry an entire 
collection of music without pulling a 
trailer of CDs.
For simplicity, think of this 
heterogeneity as being summarized by 
an establishment’s ability to convert 
work effort into a product consumers 
are willing to buy. Let’s also suppose 
that an establishment that is better at 
converting its workers’ efforts into rev-
enue also sells more goods and earns a 
bigger profit. The two lines in Figure 2, 
Panel A show how an establishment’s 
innate ability translates into its de-
mand for workers and profits. A plant 
with a higher ability will have larger 
sales, which requires it to hire more 
workers and yields more profits.
Changes in Ability Over Time. 
The second element of the theory 
is that a plant’s ability changes over 
time. This may arise from luck9 or the 
uncertain returns from investing in 
product or process innovation. Take 
Apple again. Over 30 years it has had 
some real big hits, such as the Apple 
II, Mac, iPod, and iPhone, and some 
other products that didn’t sell so well, 
such as the Apple III or Lisa. With 
its successes and failures Apple has 
expanded and contracted over time, 
adding and subtracting workers as 
profits rose and fell.
The specific points in Panel A of 
Figure 2 capture one possible path of a 
plant’s ability over time in our simpli-
fied framework. In period 1, a plant 
starts out with low ability. In period 2, 
it becomes better and has high ability. 
In period 3, its ability slips back to me-
dium. Notice that as a plant gets better 
and worse at producing, it adds and 
subtracts workers (from low workers 
to high workers to medium workers) 
and its profits fluctuate as well (from 
low profits to high profits to medium 
profits).
Costs of Exporting. The third 
element of the theory is that there are 
costs to exporting. To make things 
simple, we consider two types of costs: 
fixed costs, which don’t depend on the 
amount being sold in the market; and 
variable costs, which depend on the 
amount sold in the foreign market.
The fixed costs can also be split 
into upfront costs and continuation 
costs. Upfront costs reflect the invest-
ments that a plant must make prior to 
exporting its product. Some examples 
of these costs are the market research 
about the export market, investments 
to tailor its product to a specific mar-
ket, and the creation of marketing and 
distribution networks. Many of these 
costs are specific to the product being 
exported and are said to be sunk costs, 
since they have no residual value to 
any other establishment. These invest-
ments are made upfront and do not 
really depend on how many units are 
subsequently sold. Continuation costs 
are costs incurred each period to con-
tinue selling in the market, and again, 
these do not depend on the amount 
to be sold in the current period. In 
the case of the Smart Four-Two, the 
product needed to be modified to U.S. 
safety and emission standards, a dealer 
network needed to be established with 
salesmen and mechanics, plus parts 
needed to be stocked for repairs. The 
costs of maintaining these dealer and 
repair networks must be incurred each 
period to keep selling in the U.S. and 
are typically lower than the costs of 
entering the export market. (See Esti-
mates of the Costs of Trade.)
The variable costs to trade essen-
tially are those costs that increase the 
cost to consumers in the destination 
TABLE 3





Levels (4 years prior to exporting)
Sales 27% 85%
Employment 21% 51%
Growth rate (4 years leading to exporting)
Sales 2.4% 3.6%
Employment 1.4% 3.0%
The top panel (levels) shows that plants that start exporting (in 1988 in U.S. and in 2001 in Chile) 
already have a size advantage, either in sales or employment, four years prior to starting to export 
(1984 in U.S. and 1997 in Chile). The second panel shows that these new exporters grow faster 
than plants that did not export at all in the entire period. U.S. statistics are from Bernard and 
Jensen, Tables 2 and 3. Chile statistics are based on our own calculations.   
9 By luck we mean that a producer’s sales might 
be affected by something outside its control 
such as the weather or the decisions of other 
producers. For instance, a farmer may face a 
drought, a competitor may succeed in develop-
ing a product that makes another product 
obsolete, or alternatively, a customer may find a 
new use for an existing product, making it more 
valuable. 6   Q4  2010 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
market of each unit shipped. Some 
examples of these costs are packaging, 
shipping (air, ocean, rail/truck), insur-
ance, and tariffs.  
How Ability and Export Costs 
Affect Sales at Home and Abroad. 
The fourth element of the model is 
explaining how a firm’s ability in one 
market translates into its ability/profits 
in a second market, given the costs 
of trade. For now let’s suppose that 
consumers like goods equally in both 
markets, so that if an establishment 
charges the same price overseas as 
it does at home, it will sell the same 
amount overseas as it does at home. 
To start, suppose there are only 
variable trade costs; that is, fixed 
costs are equal to zero, so that it is 
more costly for a firm to sell more of 
its products in foreign markets. In 
this case, the firm would not want 
to charge the same price on exports, 
since these exports cost more to deliver 
to consumers in the export market and 
this will lower profits. For instance, 
suppose there is a 5 percent tariff, so 
that a product that sells in the U.S. for 
$100 will now sell overseas for $105. 
This higher price will tend to lower 
both the amount sold and hence prof-
its on sales in the destination market. 
In Panel B of Figure 2 this is depicted 
by the brown line, which shows that 
for the same ability the plant will make 
lower profits on its exports than on its 
domestic sales. 
Now, suppose that in addition 
to variable costs there are also fixed 
costs to exporting. Moreover, assume 
that the costs of starting to export are 
the same as the costs of continuing to 
FIGURE 2
                                
Function of Ability
                                   
and Trade Costs
C. Value of Exporting with Upfront 
and Continuation Costs
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export. There is now a simple tradeoff 
between current profits and the cost of 
selling overseas. Essentially, the profits 
of exporting are lowered by the cost 
of exporting so that export profits are 
lower at every ability level (denoted by 
the black line in Panel B of Figure 2). 
To make things concrete, suppose 
a plant is considering exporting today 
and that exporting will cost $100 
regardless of how much the plant sells 
overseas. For it to be worthwhile to ex-
port, the plant must earn enough extra 
profits in the foreign market to cover 
the $100 cost of entering the market. 
Consequently, excluding the $100 
upfront cost, a plant that gains $125 
in profit from exporting will enter the 
export market, since it will make a net 
profit of $25, while a plant that gains 
only $75 will not export, since it would 
end up losing $25 by exporting.
More generally, because produc-
ers don’t like to lose money, they will 
export only when profits net of these 
export costs are greater than zero. 
Since profits increase with ability, this 
means that there is some minimum 
ability level, call it ability*, so that only 
establishments with ability equal to or 
above ability* will export. 
Putting It All Together. The fi-
nal piece of the model is to understand 
how the decision to export changes 
when the upfront costs of starting to 
export are larger than the costs of 
continuing to export. With this cost 
structure of exporting, a plant that 
pays the costs of starting to export 
today will have the option to continue 
exporting in future periods by paying 
the lower continuation costs. Because 
this investment in exporting lowers the 
plant’s future costs of exporting, mak-
ing it cheaper to continue exporting 
in the future, the plant must consider 
how both its current and future profits 
are affected by entering the exporting 
market. Thus, a plant will export when 
the total additional profits earned over 
time from exporting exceed the ad-
ditional costs of exporting.  
To make the dynamic aspects of 
the export decision clear, let’s think 
about a plant that is considering 
exporting its product for two peri-
ods: today and tomorrow. Suppose it 
considers only two periods because 
its competitor is developing a supe-
rior product that is going to make its 
product obsolete. By exporting, it will 
earn profits of $100 today and $100 
tomorrow. Suppose further that start-
ing to export costs $125, while the cost 
of staying in the export market is only 
$25. If the plant exports today and 
tomorrow, it will lose $25 today and 
make profits of $75 tomorrow. Now, if 
the plant values future profits in the 
same way as current losses, it will start 
exporting because the total profits of 
$50 over the lifetime of the investment 
exceed the costs.
Consider now how the decision to 
export is different in the second period 
than in the first. Having arrived in the 
second period, the plant will continue 
to export as long as the profits from 
doing so exceed the costs, which are 
lower, only $25. So the plant will need 
a much smaller scale of operation to 
continue to export than it needed to 
start. Of course, the plant will take 
into account the likelihood of these 





national trade are 
important because 
it allows policy-
makers to prioritize reform. For 
instance, we can ask whether we 
should cut tariffs, improve infra-
structure at ports and customs, alter 
product standards, provide export-
ers with financing, or alter the tax 
code.
In general, the barriers to trade 
are quite large. One way of mea-
suring them is to ask: How much 
would these barriers have to add to 
the price of a good shipped inter-
nationally to explain the amount 
of trade we actually see in the 
data? This methodology assumes 
that trade makes imported goods 
relatively more expensive, lowering 
demand. In a recent Business Review 
article, Edith Ostapik and Kei-Mu 
Yi take this approach and find 
that barriers to international trade 
add about 74 percent to the price of 
foreign-produced goods.
Traditionally, these model-based 
measures of trade barriers ignore the 
salient characteristics of exporters we 
have summarized. However, a similar 
exercise can be undertaken using the 
model we have sketched out. In one 
of our studies (2007), we estimate the 
fixed costs (both upfront sunk costs 
and those to continue in the market) 
separately from the per unit cost of 
exports for U.S. exporters. We find 
that the cost of starting to export is 
nearly four times larger than the cost 
of continuing to export. Including 
these fixed costs, we now find that the 
per unit cost of trade adds about 45 
percent to the price of imported goods, 
or about 75 percent of what one would 
find ignoring exporter characteristics 
(in which case the cost is closer to 66 
percent). This suggests that the costs 
involved in entering and staying in 
export markets account for about one-
quarter of the barriers to international 
trade.8   Q4  2010 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
profits in the second period when 
deciding to start exporting in the first 
period.
Panel C plots the net gain in prof-
its to a plant from exporting. Because 
this is based on a plant’s current and 
future ability, just like current profits, 
this also increases with a plant’s cur-
rent ability. A plant that is not export-
ing but would like to export must pay 
a high cost to start exporting, so this 
will shift down the value of exporting 
by the entry cost and there will be a 
cutoff, ability*, so that only plants with 
ability greater than or equal to ability* 
find that the benefits of exporting 
exceed the costs. For a plant that is 
already exporting, the cost of continu-
ing in the export market is smaller 
and so there is a different threshold, 
ability**, such that all producers with 
ability above ability** find it worth-
while to export. Given that the costs 
of starting to export are greater than 
the costs of continuing to export, the 
threshold to start exporting is higher 
than the threshold to continue export-
ing (ability*>ability**).
Finally, we consider how the gains 
to exporting affect the thresholds to 
export. Specifically, if the variable 
trade cost to a destination is lower 
(say, because tariffs are low or it is 
in close proximity, leading to lower 
shipping costs), a producer will sell 
more for the same ability. In panel D, 
this means that the value of export-
ing to this destination will be higher 
for a given ability. (In practice, this 
shows up as an upward rotation of the 
value of starting [brown dashed line] 
and the value of continuing export-
ing [black dashed line]). This makes 
that market more attractive. Because 
the export market is more attractive, 
some lower ability nonexporters will 
find it profitable to start exporting, 
leading to a lower threshold ability*’. 
Similarly, some low ability exporters 
will now find it worthwhile to continue 
exporting, so the threshold to continue 
exporting, ability**’, will also be lower. 
With lower cutoffs, there will be more 
exporters and each exporter will sell 
more.
Having described our model, we 
can now study how changes in a plant’s 
ability — recall that this is either pro-
ductivity or quality — over time affect 
sales, employment, and the decision to 
export. Table 4 considers a particular 
sequence of abilities over a 10-year pe-
riod for a single plant. We also include 
the labor that the plant hires each 
period to satisfy demand for its product 
at home and abroad (if it exports). 
The plant originally starts small, 
selling just at home. Over time, as its 
ability improves, it adds workers. In 
year three, once it has become suf-
ficiently productive, it starts exporting 
and needs to hire additional workers to 
produce goods for the foreign market. 
The plant’s ability improves until year 
6 and then starts to decline. In year 10, 
the plant’s ability has fallen so far that 
it is no longer worthwhile to export 
and so it sells just at home. Notice that 
the plant continued to export even 
after its ability had slipped below the 
level when it started exporting. This is 
because the cost of staying in the mar-
ket is lower than the cost of starting to 
export, and so the ability threshold to 
exit is lower than the ability threshold 
to start exporting.
SUCCEEDING TO EXPORT? OR 
EXPORTING TO SUCCEED?
With this simple model in place, 
we return to a key question about 
exporting: Does success beget export-
ing, or does exporting lead to success? 
We can use our model to see which 
of these views has more support. If 
success begets exporting, our model, 
which is based on this idea, should 
be able to explain the key facts we’ve 
described. If exporting really does lead 
to success, our simple model will not 
be able to capture these same facts. 
First, consider how our model can 
capture the size advantages of export-
ers and the persistence of their export 
US statistics are based on calculations from Bernard and Jensen (1999) which is based on data from 
the U.S. Longitudinal Research Database. Chile statistics are based on the industrial census. TABLE 4
An Example of a Plant’s Dynamics
Workers for exports are the additional workers hired to produce products for export.
Year Ability Workers for Domestic Workers for Exports
Total 
Workers
11 5 0 5
21 . 8 9 0 9
32 1 0 2 1 2
42 . 2 1 1 2 . 2 1 3 . 2
52 . 4 1 2 2 . 4 1 4 . 4
62 . 8 1 4 2 . 8 1 6 . 8
72 . 2 1 1 2 . 2 1 3 . 2
82 1 0 2 1 2
9 1.8 9 1.8 10.8
10 1.5 7.5 0 7.5Business Review  Q4  2010   9 www.philadelphiafed.org
participation. In our model, because 
of the fixed costs, not all establish-
ments export. Exporting is worthwhile 
only when plants have high ability. 
Consequently, the model explains 
why exporters tend to be bigger and 
have more ability than nonexporters. 
Additionally, if the costs of continuing 
to export are low relative to the costs 
to start, once a plant starts exporting, 
it will continue exporting for a long 
time, as in the data. So the decision 
to export will be quite persistent, as in 
the data. 
Next, consider how our model can 
also capture the level and growth ad-
vantages of future exporters described 
in Table 3. 
With regard to the size advantages 
of future exporters, recall, for instance, 
that in the U.S., plants that will export 
in the future have about 27 percent 
more employees than those plants that 
will not export in the future. To under-
stand how the model generates the size 
differences of future exporters, con-
sider two plants with different abilities: 
one plant with ability 1 and the other 
with ability 1.5. Suppose that both 
plants’ ability improves by 10 percent 
and that it takes an ability of 1.6 to 
start exporting. Now the higher ability 
plant, whose ability has improved to 
1.65, will export, and the low ability 
plant, whose ability has improved to 
1.1, will not export, generating a size 
premium of future exporters. As long 
as future ability depends positively on 
current ability, in the future, high abil-
ity plants will be more likely to export 
than low ability plants and there will 
be a size premium of future exporters. 
Next, consider the growth advan-
tages of future exporters. Recall that 
in the U.S., plants that export in the 
future grow 1.4 percent faster per year 
than plants that do not export in the 
future. Take two plants with the same 
ability today, normalized to 1. Suppose 
that, to export, a plant needs an ability 
of 1.5. If tomorrow we observe that one 
plant is exporting and the other is not 
exporting, it must be the case that the 
exporter’s ability improved by more 
than that of the plant that did not ex-
port. This may explain why plants that 
eventually export experience more 
growth than those that don’t.
Our simple model of exporting 
captures the key characteristics of 
exporters and nonexporters at a mo-
ment in time and over time. This is 
consistent with the idea that successful 
plants become exporters. 
MACROECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF MICRO 
HETEROGENEITY
The basic model developed here 
captures the salient features of manu-
facturers that export. It also provides 
some insights into the determinants of 
aggregate trade flows across destina-
tions and over time. We now show 
how the model of entry and exit from 
exporting can matter for aggregate 
trade flows by first looking at how the 
characteristics of U.S. exporters differ 
by destination. We then consider how 
changes in the characteristics of U.S. 
exporters are related to changes in the 
volume of U.S. exports to the rest of 
the world.
Looking at the volume of U.S. ex-
ports by destination10 in 2006, we see 
from Figure 3 that the value of exports 
(measured in U.S. dollars) increases 
with the number of exporters. Indeed, 
the value of exports rises faster than 
the number of exporters, so that a des-
tination with 10 percent more export-
ers tends to receive 12.8 percent more 
U.S. exports. This suggests that desti-
10  The data for the destination-specific 
analysis described in this paragraph and 
in Figures 3, 4, and 5 come from the U.S. 
Exporter Database, available from the U.S. 
Department of Commerce’s International Trade 
Administration division. Unlike the case with 
our plant-level data, the unit of analysis here is 
the firm. These data are available at http://ita.
doc.gov/td/industry/otea/edb/index.html.
FIGURE 3
Value of Exports Rises Faster than
Number of Exporters
Value of exports ($- Logarithm)
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FIGURE 4
Exports Per Firm Are Rising With
Number of Exporters
FIGURE 5
Markets with More Exporters Attract
Smaller Exporters
nations with a high volume of exports 
tend to have exporters that are selling 
a lot on average. One way of seeing 
this is to plot the average exports per 
firm against the number of exporters 
in each destination market (Figure 4). 
Recall from our theory that firms sell 
more overseas if the variable costs are 
lower. So Figure 4 suggests that the 
costs of shipping to these destinations 
are lower, which increases demand 
for exports and sales per exporter. 
Additionally, because these variable 
costs are lower and firms can sell more 
in these markets, these markets also 
attract more exporters. Indeed, our 
theory says that these more attrac-
tive markets should attract more low 
ability firms. Figure 5, which plots the 
number of exporters against the share 
of big exporters (those with more than 
500 employees) in 2006, shows this is 
the case. Destinations with more U.S. 
exporters also tend to attract a smaller 
share of large exporters.
Looking across destination mar-
kets provides some insight into how 
exports may expand through time. An-
other, perhaps more direct, approach 
is to directly examine how exports and 
the characteristics of exporters have 
changed over time. 
In a recent paper (Alessandria and 
Choi, 2010), we study how the U.S. 
has increased its trade with the rest of 
the world. Specifically, we examine the 
change in the share of U.S. manu-
facturing output that was exported 
from 1987 to 2002. Again, focusing 
on those establishments with 100 or 
more employees, we find that the share 
of manufacturing output exported 
rose from 6.1 percent to 9.7 percent. 
We then show that this nearly 46.4 
percent change in the share of output 
being exported11 can be broken down 
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11 Changes in this section are calculated using 
the log of a variable so that the change in trade 
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